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Abstract: Historians of all kinds are beginning to return to temporally 
expansive studies after decades of aversion and neglect. There are even 
signs that intellectual historians are returning to the longue durée. What 
are the reasons for this revival of long-range intellectual history? And how 
might  it  be  rendered  methodologically  robust  as  well  as  historically 
compelling?  This  article  proposes  a  model  of  transtemporal  history, 
proceeding via serial contextualism to create a history in ideas spanning 
centuries, even millennia: key examples come from work in progress on 
ideas of civil war from ancient Rome to the present. The article concludes 
with brief reflections on the potential impact of the digital humanities on 
the practice of intellectual history. 
Keywords:  Cambridge  School;  civil  war;  conceptual  history;  digital 
humanities; longue durée. 
 
                                                 
† Forthcoming, History of European Ideas, 38 (2012). This article is a revised version of 
the Annual Nicolai Rubinstein Lecture in the History of Political Thought and Intellectual 
History  given  at  Queen  Mary,  University  of  London,  on  29  March  2012.  For  their 
comments and encouragement, I am especially grateful to Richard Bourke, Jo Guldi, Jim 
Kloppenberg, Darrin McMahon, Sophie Rosenfeld and Quentin Skinner. - 2 - 
In  many  realms  of  historical  writing,  big  is  back.  In  some  areas—historical 
archaeology, comparative sociology or world-systems theory—it never went away. In 
others, it clearly has disappeared, never to return: the globe-spanning universal histories 
associated  with  Oswald  Spengler  and  Arnold  Toynbee  seem  unlikely  to  be  imitated 
again,  at  least  as  lifelong,  multi-volume  projects  by  single  authors  driven  by  a 
comprehensive  vision  of  civilisation.
1  Across  the  historical  profession,  the  telescope 
rather than the microscope is increasingly the preferred instrument of examination; the 
long-shot not the close-up is becoming an ever-more prevalent picture of the past. A tight 
focus  has  hardly  been  abandoned,  as  the  continuing  popularity  of  biography  and  the 
utility of microhistory both amply show. However, it is being supplemented by broad 
panoramas of both space and time displayed under various names: “world history”, “deep 
history”  and  “big  history”.  This  return  to  the  longue  durée  presents  challenges  and 
opportunities for all historians:
2 here I want to consider its implications for the practice of 
intellectual history. 
At its most ambitious, big history—so-called by its practitioners, who have now 
founded an International Big History Association—stretches back to the Big Bang itself.
3 
This is a universal history that is coterminous with the universe itself, drawing on the 
findings of cosmology, astronomy, geology and evolutionary biology as well as more 
conventionally  historical  disciplines  like  archaeology  and  historical  sociology.  By 
                                                 
1 David Christian, “The Return of Universal History”, History and Theory 49 (2010), pp. 
6-27. 
2  For  broader  reflections  on  the  implications  of  this  movement  see  Ignacio  Olabarri,  
“‘New’ New History: A Longue Durée Structure”, History and Theory 34 (1995), pp. 1–
29; Barbara Weinstein, “History Without a Cause? Grand Narratives, World History, and 
the Postcolonial Dilemma”, International Review of Social History 50 (2005), pp. 71–93; 
David Armitage and Jo Guldi, “The Return of the Longue Durée” (forthcoming). 
3 David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History, new edn. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011). - 3 - 
contrast, “deep” history is relatively parochial, in that it delves only into the human past. 
It is self-defined as “deep” largely because it breaches the barrier between “pre-history” 
and history in the conventional sense of recorded history, the past as recoverable through 
the various signifying texts conscious constructed by agents who bequeathed them to the 
future.
4 Such deep history relies on genetics, neurophysiology and evolutionary biology, 
among other fields. Like the even bigger big history, it sees the conscious history of 
humans as both relatively brief and continuous with developments that long preceded the 
human  ability  to  historicise  themselves.  By  contrast,  the  comparatively  unambitious 
“world” historians have usually confined themselves to a still narrower band of time, to 
thousands  rather  than  tens  of  thousands  or  even  billions  of  years,  and  to  the 
Anthropocene in which humans shaped their environment and were shaped by it.
5  
Big history, in all its guises has been inhospitable to the questions of meaning and 
intention so central to intellectual history. This is not simply for the banal reason that the 
big historians usually scrutinise such a superficial slice of recorded history at the end of 
their grand sweeps: as Mark Twain deflatingly noted, “If the Eiffel Tower were now 
representing the world’s age, the skin of paint on the pinnacle-knob at its summit would 
represent man’s share of that age.”
6 Nor is it just because human agency dwindles in 
significance in the face of cosmological or even archaeological time. It is due, for the 
                                                 
4 Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California 
Press,  2008);  Andrew  Shryock  and  Daniel  Lord  Smail,  eds.,  Deep  History:  The 
Architecture of Past and Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
5 Patrick Manning, Navigating World History: A Guide for Researchers and Teachers 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Patrick Manning, ed., World History: Global 
and  Local  Interactions ( Princeton,  NJ:  M.  Wiener,  2006);  Dipesh  Chakrabarty, 
“Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change”, New Literary History 43 
(2012), pp. 1–18. 
6 Mark Twain, “The Damned Human Race” (1903), quoted in Christian, Maps of Time, p. 
5. - 4 - 
moment at least, to the essential materialism of the two main strains of big history, what 
we might call the biologistic and the economistic tendencies. 
The  biologistic  tendency  is  neurophysiologically  reductive:  when  all  human 
actions, including thought and culture, can be explained by brain chemistry, reflections 
approximate to reflexes.
7 In the economistic strain, intellect is assimilated to interest as 
each age simply “gets the thought that it needs”. For instance, Buddhism, Christianity and 
Islam in the Axial Age are all the same in the end: simply the product of the problem-
solving capacity of some rather clever but needy chimps.
8 In these regards, at least when 
it treats the questions of most concern to intellectual historians, deep history can appear 
to be somewhat shallow. 
The original historians of the longue durée, the French Annalistes, were not much 
more  sympathetic  to  the  concerns  of  intellectual  history.  There  was  the  occasional 
distinguished counter-example, like Lucien Febvre, whose Le problème de l'incroyance 
au XVIe siècle (1942) treated the unthinkable rather than what had been thought, but even 
Febvre  was  highly  critical  of  the  history  of  philosophy  produced  by  Ernst  Cassirer, 
Raymond Klibansky and others: “concepts produced, one might imagine, by disembodied 
intellects living a totally unreal life in the realm of pure ideas.”
9 In his classic essay on 
the  longue  durée,  Fernand  Braudel  did  express  admiration  for  masterworks  by  such 
                                                 
7 Smail, On Deep History and the Brain; for an example of intellectual history in this 
manner, see Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York, W. W. Norton, 
2007), pp. 32-34 and passim. 
8 Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They 
Reveal About the Future (London: Profile Books, 2010), pp. 420, 476, 568, 621. 
9 Lucien Febvre, Le problème de l'incroyance au XVIe siècle, la religion de Rabelais  
(Paris:  A.  Michel,  1942);  “…  concepts  issus,  pourrait-on  croire,  d’intelligences 
désincarnées et vivant, d’une vie toute irréelle, dans la sphére des idées pures”: Lucien 
Febvre, “Puissance et declin d’une croyance”, Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 9 
(1937), p. 89. - 5 - 
cultural and literary historians as Ernst Robert Curtius and Febvre himself, but he saw 
their  chefs-d’oeuvre  as  in  effect  mythographies,  studies  of  unmoving  and  even 
immoveable continuities, in which “mental frameworks were also prisons of the longue 
durée”.
10 Intellectual history would have to be subsumed into a history of mentalités that 
were by definition collective—treating the habits of an individual “in common with other 
men [sic] of his time”—and diachronic, therefore “more or less immobile”.
11 
Braudel’s  examples  of  these  enduring  elements  of  the  collective,  unmoving 
outillage mentale included the idea of the crusade, the practice of geometrical pictorial 
space and an “Aristotelian concept of the universe” that was not dethroned until the 
Scientific Revolution. According to Braudel, these were subject to the same imperative of 
“permanence and survival” that characterised the lives of transhumant shepherds, trapped 
by the rhythmic cycles of their flocks, or of city-sites fixed by their topographies and 
geographies. He found them to be similarly independent of the ruptures and inversions 
taking place at the level of histoire événementielle. The longue durée as defined by the 
Annales historians was therefore infertile territory for intellectual historians. As Franco 
Venturi  noted  of  their  approach,  “The  whole  ‘geological’  structure  of  the  past  is 
examined, but not the soil in which ideas themselves germinate and grow.”
12 
Even  as  the  historians  of  the  longue  durée  were  rejecting  intellectual  history, 
intellectual historians were inoculating themselves against the longue durée. In his classic 
                                                 
10  “…  les  cadres  mentaux,  aussi,  sont  prisons  de  longue  durée”:  Fernand  Braudel, 
“Histoire et Sciences sociales. La longue durée”, Annales E.S.C. 13 (1958), pp. 731, 732. 
11  Roger  Chartier,  “Intellectual  History  or  Sociocultural  History?  The  French 
Trajectories”,  in  Dominick  LaCapra  and  Steven  L.  Kaplan,  eds.,  Modern  European 
Intellectual  History:  Reappraisals  and  New  Perspectives  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University 
Press, 1982), pp. 22 (quoting Jacques Le Goff), 25. 
12  Braudel,  “La  longue  durée”,  p.  732;  Franco  Venturi,  Utopia  and  Reform  in  the 
Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1971), p. 14. - 6 - 
1969  article,  “Meaning  and  Understanding  in  the  History  of  Ideas”,  Quentin  Skinner 
criticised Arthur Lovejoy’s history of ideas and other long-range intellectual-historical 
projects (such as the teaching of Great Books in political theory) for reifying ideas into 
entities with life-stories but no substance, for ignoring agency and denying intention and, 
most devastatingly, for conjuring up “a history not of ideas at all, but abstractions: a 
history  of  thoughts  which  no  one  ever  actually  succeeded  in  thinking,  at  a  level  of 
coherence which no one ever actually attained.” Such a misbegotten methodology stood 
accused  of  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  those—particularly  political  scientists—who 
abstracted arguments from their contexts to recover a timeless wisdom: timeless because 
untethered to specific moments of strategic deployment, and timeless in the sense that 
they endured across great swathes of time, often from (Western) antiquity to the present. 
Skinner concluded that “such histories can sometimes go wrong, but that they can never 
go right.” His proposed solution to this syllabus of errors was ever tighter rhetorical and 
temporal  contextualisation  by  conceiving  of  ideas  as  arguments  and  of  arguments  as 
moves within language-games.
13 
Intellectual  historians,  at  least  in  the  English-speaking  world,  would  focus 
henceforth on the synchronic and the short-term, not the diachronic and the long-range. 
Its stress on individual actors and their intentions was also at a far remove from the 
aggregative and anonymising procedures of a serial histoire des mentalités. Its defining 
attention to speech-acts, conceived within the broadly analytical philosophical tradition 
of J. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein, long stifled any interchange with the more 
temporally expansive school of Begriffsgeschichte, with its fundamentally Heideggerian 
                                                 
13 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, History and 
Theory 8 (1969), pp. 18, 35. - 7 - 
articulation of the continuities between past, present and future.
14 The separation between 
intellectual history and the longue durée therefore seemed both complete and irreversible 
as the historians of the longue durée foreswore intellectual history and intellectual history 
itself would henceforth be practiced in opposition to the longue durée. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Because of this mutual repulsion, longue-durée intellectual history remained until 
recently an oxymoron, approximating to an impossibility, enclosing a profound moral 
error. But the first law of academic dynamics is that for every action there is a reaction: 
babies get thrown out with the bathwater, but they have an uncanny way of finding their 
feet again. In the past few years, intellectual histories of increasingly longue durées have 
begun to appear again. I am thinking here of works in very different registers, from 
Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self (1989), which lightly deploys history in the service 
of a just-so story, via Martin Jay’s Songs of Experience (2005), Jerrold Seigel’s The Idea 
of the Self (2005), Darrin McMahon’s Happiness: A History (2006), Lorraine Daston and 
Peter  Galison’s  Objectivity  (2007)  and  Peter  Garnsey’s  Thinking  About  Property 
(2007),
15 to a group of more recent and imminently forthcoming works: for example, 
                                                 
14  Though  for  more  recent  rapprochements  between  the  “Cambridge  School”  and 
conceptual history see especially Melvin Richter, The History of Political and Social 
Concepts: A Critical Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Hartmutt 
Lehmann and Melvin Richter, eds., The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New 
Studies  on  Begriffsgeschichte  (Washington,  DC:  German  Historical  Institute,  1996); 
Quentin  Skinner,  “Rhetoric  and  Conceptual  Change”,  Finnish  Yearbook  of  Political 
Thought 2 (1998), pp. 60-73. 
15 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1989);  Martin  Jay,  Songs  of  Experience:  Modern 
American  and  European  Variations  on  a  Universal  Theme  (Berkeley:  University  of - 8 - 
Sophia Rosenfeld’s Common Sense: A Political History (2011), Rainer Forst’s Toleration 
in  Conflict  (2012),  James  Kloppenberg’s  Tragic  Irony:  Democracy  in  European  and 
American Thought, Richard Bourke’s Democracy: Representing Equality in History and 
McMahon’s Genius: A History, as well as my own work on conceptions of civil war, to 
which I will return shortly.
16 
What links these works is their ambition to construct diachronic histories focused 
on what my title has rather vulgarly called “big ideas”: that is, central concepts in our 
political, ethical and scientific vocabularies that have deep pasts and in most cases have 
also  been  decisively  transvalued  at  some  point  in  the  last  three  hundred  years.  The 
tendency marked by all these books has been labelled by Darrin McMahon “The Return 
of the History of Ideas?”, with an all-important question mark.
17 This is conceivably a 
“return”  because  it  resembles  nothing  so  much  as  the  old-fangled  “history  of  ideas” 
associated  with  Lovejoy  and  his  acolytes:  diachronic,  temporally  ambitious, 
interdisciplinary (at least to the degree that it deals with different genres of intellectual 
production) and focused on leading concepts in mostly Euro-American history. 
                                                                                                                                                
California Press, 2005); Jerrold Seigel,  The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in 
Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005);  Darrin  M.  McMahon,  Happiness: A   History  (New  York:  Grove  Press,  2006); 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007); Peter 
Garnsey, Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
16 Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense: A Political History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University  Press,  2011);  Rainer  Forst,  Toleration  in  Conflict:  Past  and  Present 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); James T. Kloppenberg, Tragic Irony: 
Democracy in European and American Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming); Richard Bourke, Democracy: Representing Equality in History (London: 
Profile Books, forthcoming); Darrin M. McMahon, Genius: A History (New York: Basic 
Books, forthcoming). 
17 Darrin M. McMahon, “The Return of the History of Ideas?”, in Darrin M. McMahon 
and Samuel Moyn, eds., Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). - 9 - 
Put as broadly as this, the parallels might be sound, but closer scrutiny reveals 
defining  differences.  No  intellectual  historian  would  now  use  Lovejoy’s  creaking 
metaphors  of  “unit-ideas”  as  chemical  elements,  nor  would  they  assume  that  the 
biography  of  an  idea  could  be  written  as  if  it  had  a  quasi-biological  continuity  and 
identity  through  time,  along  with  a  life-cycle  longer  than  that  of  any  mortal  human 
subject. There might be a family resemblance between the original history of ideas and its 
revenant namesake, but the kinship is artificial, not least because this new history of ideas 
has emerged in response to the profound critiques of Lovejoy’s methods that emerged 
after his death in 1962. Indeed, this may not be so much a return as the reinvention of 
long-range  intellectual  history  to  become  something  quite  different:  a  method  that  is 
robust, that can appeal to a broad academic and even non-academic readership, and that 
can bring intellectual history back into conversation with other forms of “big” history. 
Out of this reinvention, I believe, we can effect a greatly overdue rapprochement between 
intellectual history and the longue durée. 
To  justify  that  rapprochement,  let  me  offer  three  means  which  I  hope  will 
instantiate and illuminate this new breed of long-range intellectual history. The first is 
that we think of it as transtemporal history, on the analogy of transnational history. The 
second is that it should proceed by a method of serial contextualism by deploying the 
distinctive  procedures  of  Anglo-American  intellectual  history,  but  by  doing  so 
diachronically as well as synchronically. And the third is a proposal to conceive the result 
of this transtemporal serial contextualism as a history in ideas to distinguish it from the 
distrusted and discredited “history of ideas” associated with Lovejoy and his acolytes. 
What I want to do now is the explain each of these terms briefly and then to illustrate - 10 - 
how I have been trying to put them into practice in writing a history of conceptions of 
civil war from Ancient Rome to the twenty-first century. 
I have appropriated the term transtemporal history on the model of transnational 
history to stress elements of linkage and comparison across time, much as transnational 
history deals with such connections across space. (Unlike “transnational”, a term first 
found  in  the  humanistic  context  of  mid-nineteenth-century  philology,  “transtemporal” 
was originally a term of art in anatomy meaning “[c]rossing the temples; traversing the 
temporal lobe of the brain”: perhaps a not wholly inapt borrowing to describe a mode of 
intellectual history.)
 18 Transnational history is both expansive and controlled: expansive, 
because it deliberately aims to transcend the histories of bounded nations or states, yet 
controlled in that it generally treats processes, conjunctures and institutions that crossed 
the borders of those historical units.
19 
Transnational history does not deny the existence of the national even its effort to 
go  above  and  beyond  the  determinants  of  national  space.  Likewise,  I  submit, 
transtemporal  history  should  be  extensive  but  similarly  delimited:  it  links  discrete 
contexts,  moments  and  periods  while  maintaining  the  synchronic  specificity  of  those 
contexts. Transtemporal history is not transhistorical: it is time-bound not timeless, to 
avoid  the  dangers  of  reification  and  denial  of  agency  inherent  in  Lovejoy’s  abstract, 
                                                 
18 Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Transnational”, in Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., The 
Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
pp. 1047-55; OED, s.v., “transtemporal”. 
19  Patricia  Clavin,  “Defining  Transnationalism”,  Contemporary  European  History  14 
(2005),  pp.  421-39;  C.  A.  Bayly,  Sven  Beckert,  Matthew  Connelly,  Isabel  Hofmeyr, 
Wendy  Kozol,  and  Patricia  Seed,  “AHR  Conversation:  On  Transnational  History”, 
American  Historical  Review  111  (2006),  pp.  1441-64;  David  Armitage,  “The 
International  Turn  in  Intellectual  History”,  in  McMahon  and  Moyn,  eds.,  Rethinking 
Modern European Intellectual History; Armitage, Foundations of Modern International 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). - 11 - 
atemporal history of ideas, for example. It also stresses the mechanisms of connection 
between moments and is therefore concerned with questions of concrete transmission, 
tradition and reception, again unlike the traditional history of ideas which assumed but 
did not investigate how ideas travelled materially and institutionally across time. 
This  transtemporal  history  will  necessarily  proceed  by  means  of  serial 
contextualism. By this I mean the reconstruction of a sequence of distinct contexts in 
which identifiable agents strategically deployed existing languages to effect definable 
goals  such  as  legitimation  and  deligitimation,  persuasion  and  dissuasion,  consensus-
building and radical innovation, for instance. At least since the contextualist revolution 
initiated by Skinner in 1969, most self-confessed contextualist intellectual historians have 
construed  context  synchronically  and  punctually:  that  is,  as  defined  with  a  narrow 
chronologically and implicitly discontinuous with other contexts. One original purpose 
behind interpreting context so stringently was to discourage recourse to the longue-durée 
history  of  ideas  à  la  Lovejoy  that  ignored  context  and  downplayed  the  agency  of 
language-users.  This  salutary  exercise  may  however  have  had  the  unintended 
consequence that intellectual historians sealed off similar contexts that occurred earlier or 
later in time from one another to create what one critic of contextualism has imagined as 
“history’s mail-train hauling self-synchronized periods in series like boxcars”.
20 
There is no good reason why we cannot overcome that objection by building 
corridors  between  the  cars,  as  it  were:  that  is,  ways  of  joining  diachronically 
reconstructed contexts across time—transtemporally—to produce longer-range histories 
which are neither artificially punctuated nor deceptively continuous. There are models for 
                                                 
20  Herbert  F.  Tucker,  “Introduction”,  in  Rita  Felski  and  Herbert  F.  Tucker,  eds., 
“Context?”, New Literary History 42 (2011), p. ix. - 12 - 
this, even from the heart of contexualist enterprise known as the “Cambridge School”. Is 
not  John  Pocock’s  Machiavellian  Moment  (1975)  in  effect  a  work  of  serial 
contextualism? Or Richard Tuck’s Rights of War and Peace (1999)? Or even Quentin 
Skinner’s  “Genealogy  of  the  Modern  State”  (2009)?
21  I  now  even  wonder  if  serial 
contextualism was not the method behind my own The Ideological Origins of the British 
Empire (2000): perhaps, like some intellectual-historical M. Jourdain, I can now admit 
that I have been a serial contextualist all along.
22   
As  these  examples  and  others  can  show,  conceptions  of  context  itself  have 
become increasingly transtemporal, even if they have rarely been explicitly theorised in 
diachronic  terms.  To  take  just  two  outstanding  examples,  what  was  the  rhetorical 
tradition since Aristotle, or possibly the Ad Herennium, but one diachronic but dynamic 
context within which Hobbes strategically elaborated his conception of language?
23 Or 
the long traditions of biblical exegesis and Christian Hebraism within which students of 
the  Hebrew  republic  generated  their  arguments  concerning  exclusivist  republicanism, 
egalitarian distributionism and religious toleration?
24 The works by Quentin Skinner and 
Eric Nelson treating these traditions are as rigorously contextualist as one might wish yet 
each sets synchronic engagements within diachronic traditions that are centuries, in fact 
                                                 
21 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2
nd edn. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); 
Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International 
Order  from  Grotius  to  Kant  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1999);  Quentin  Skinner,  “A 
Genealogy of the Modern State”, Proceedings of the British Academy 162 (2009), pp. 
325-70. 
22 D avid  Armitage,  The  Ideological  Origins  of  the  British  Empire  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
23  Quentin  Skinner,  Reason  and  Rhetoric  in  the  Philosophy  of  Hobbes  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
24  Eric  Nelson,  The  Hebrew  Republic:  Jewish  Sources  and  the  Transformation  of 
European Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). - 13 - 
millennia, old, even if they do not pretend to reconstruct every step in the transmission of 
those traditions as a more self-consciously serial contextualist work of the kind I have in 
mind might do.
25 
The outcome of an openly admitted and consistently pursued serial contextualism 
would be what I have called a history in ideas. I take this to be a genre of intellectual 
history in which episodes of contestation over meaning form the stepping-stones in a 
transtemporal narrative constructed over a span of time extending over decades, if not 
centuries. The “ideas” structuring this history would not be hypostatised entities, making 
intermittent entries into the mundane world from the idealism’s heavenly spheres, but 
rather  focal  points  of  arguments  shaped  and  debated  episodically  across  time  with  a 
conscious—or at least a provable connection—with both earlier and later instances of 
such struggles. Just as the history of the world has recently been suggestively told “in 100 
objects” so a history in ideas can be narrated in a finite number of moments.
26 The chosen 
ideas should be linked through time, as well as in the freight of meanings they carry from 
their dialogue with the past and, occasionally, with the future. With these, perhaps rather 
abstract, prescriptions in mind, let me now give a sense of my ongoing attempt to write 
such a transtemporal, serially contextualist history in ideas around the key moments in 
the intellectual history of civil war from ancient Rome to the present. 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
25 Compare also Eric Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), which runs from Plato to Tocqueville. 
26 Neil MacGregor, A History of the World in 100 Objects (London: Allen Lane, 2010). - 14 - 
Civil war is a prime candidate for a “history in ideas” because it has a history with 
an identifiable beginning, in the first century BCE, but as yet no discernible end.
27 It 
resists reification because it is both evaluative and descriptive: it cannot be abstracted—
despite  distinguished  attempts  to  do  so—but  must  be  historicised.  It  is  also  an 
indispensable item in our political vocabulary, yet one whose application to events is 
never without controversy. This is in part because “civil war” occurs in both technical 
discourses and non-expert speech: any one of us might think we know what civil war is 
when we see it (or have it reported to us), but there are multiple communities of experts, 
such as international lawyers, political scientists and politicians themselves, who will beg 
to differ. The history of how “civil war” was used over more than two thousand years has 
both semantic continuities and conceptual ruptures, all of which were contested at almost 
every point. However, its very ubiquity in contemporary language contrasts markedly 
with its near-absence in the first century after its invention, and its global circulation—
through every European language and from those into other language groups—belies its 
original specificity within Roman legal discourse. Conflict over its meaning, as much as 
the  meaning  of  conflict,  has  characterised  its  history  since  the  very  beginning  and 
remains a distinguishing feature of that history’s continuing force over the present.  
Civil  war  approximates  an  essentially  contested  concept  in  the  terms  made 
famous  by  the  philosopher  and  occasional  historian  of  ideas,  W.  B.  Gallie.  I  say 
“approximates” because, unlike the examples of such concepts Gallie adduced—social 
justice,  art,  democracy,  Christian  doctrine—civil  war,  although  what  he  called 
“appraisive”, is not uniformly positive as an evaluative term. However, it is internally 
                                                 
27 David Armitage, Civil War: A History in Ideas (New York: Knopf, forthcoming). - 15 - 
complex—indeed, aboriginally oxymoronic, as we shall see; it is “variably describable” 
because it lacks an a priori definition; it is liable to revision in changing circumstances; 
and it has always been used aggressively and defensively for legitimation as much as for 
delegitimation. Its application may depend on whether you are a ruler or a rebel, the 
victor or the vanquished, an established government or an interested third party.
28 What 
to a ruler looks like a rebellion against their authority may be a civil war to the insurgents 
who aim to overturn that authority. And what to the combatants may look like a civil war, 
may instead be an insurgency, a revolution or simply a time of “troubles” to outside 
observers. This very contestability helped to make it what Michel Foucault called “the 
most disparaged of all wars”.
29 
To  show  the  essentially  contested  nature  of  civil  war—and  to  show,  at  least 
partially, what my “history in ideas” of civil war will look like—let me now offer three 
transtemporal  instances  of  how  it  has  been  used.  The  first  example  comes  from  the 
second-century Greek historian of Rome’s civil wars, Appian of Alexandria, writing in 
the second century CE. Appian wrote that, in the 80s BCE, the conflict between the 
competing generals Sulla and Marius, 
 
… was the first conducted in Rome not under the guise of civil dissension, 
but nakedly as a war [polemos], with trumpets and military standards …. 
                                                 
28  W.  B.  Gallie,  “Essentially  Contested  Concepts”,  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian 
Society, 56 (1955-56), pp. 171-80. For a useful recent overview of the literature after 
Gallie,  see  David  Collier,  Fernando  Daniel  Hidalgo  and  Andra  Olivia  Maciuceanu, 
“Essentially  Contested  Concepts:  Debates  and  Applications”,  Journal  of  Political 
Ideologies 11 (2006), pp. 211-46. 
29 “…la plus décriée des guerres … la guerre civile”: Michel Foucault, letter of December 
1972, in Foucault, Dits et Écrits, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald, 4 vols. (Paris: 
Editions Gallimard, 1994), I, p. 42. - 16 - 
The episodes of civil strife escalated from rivalry and contentiousness to 
murder, and from murder to full-scale war; and this was the first army 
composed of Roman citizens to attack their own country as though it were 
a hostile power.
30  
 
Appian’s description has particular value because it comes from an historian writing in 
Greek, whose language and traditions contained no precise equivalent for the term “civil 
war”,  a  concept  that  was  specifically  and  identifiably  Roman  in  origin.
31  In  the 
intellectual genealogy of civil war, as in so much else, all roads lead back to Rome.
32 
Roman conceptions of civil war provided material for contestation until well into 
the nineteenth century. Herman Melville wrote their belated epitaph when he marked the 
surrender at Appomattox in 1865 with a poem that began, 
 
The warring eagles fold the wing, 
But not in Caesar’s sway; 
Not Rome o’ercome by Roman arms we sing, 
As on Pharsalia’s day, 
But treason thrown, though a giant grown, 
                                                 
30 Appian, The Civil Wars, trans. John Carter (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1996), pp. 32-
33 (I. 59-60). 
31 Nicole Loraux, The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens, trans. 
Corinne Pache and Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2002), pp. 24-25, 107-08. 
32 Paul Jal, La guerre civile à Rome. Étude littéraire et morale (Paris, 1963); Robert 
Brown, “The Terms Bellum Sociale and Bellum Ciuile in the Late Republic”, in Carl 
Deroux, ed., Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History, 11 (Brussels, 2003), pp. 94-
120; Brian Breed, Cynthia Damon and Andreola Rossi, eds., Citizens of Discord: Rome 
and its Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). - 17 - 
And freedom’s larger play.
33 
 
Accordingly, my second example comes from the period when Roman conceptions of 
civil war had ceded primacy to a still more confused and contentious debate over the 
relations among such conceptions as “revolution”, “rebellion”, “insurgency” and civil 
war.  It  was  the  work  of  the  nineteenth-century  Prussian  lawyer  and  first  American 
professor of political science, Francis Lieber, in 1863:  
 
Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or state, each 
contending  for  the  mastery  of  the  whole,  and  each  claiming  to  be  the 
legitimate  government.  The  term  is  also  sometimes  applied  to  war  of 
rebellion,  when  the  rebellious  provinces  or  portions  of  the  state  are 
contiguous to those containing the seat of government.
34 
 
Lieber strove to be neutral in this definition, which he composed in the middle of what 
we all now know as the US Civil War, for inclusion in the first legal codification of the 
laws of war: the famous General Orders no. 100 for the Union Army, better-known after 
its author as the Lieber Code. His definition lacked any precedent in the legal literature 
and was much more partisan and controversial in its own time than Lieber admitted. It 
did little to prevent later definitional controversy, even though the Lieber Code itself 
                                                 
33 Herman Melville, “The Surrender at Appomattox” (April 1865), quoted in Richard 
Thomas,  “‘My  brother  got  killed  in  the  war’:  Internecine  Intertextuality”,  in  Breed, 
Damon and Rossi, eds., Citizens of Discord, p. 302-03. 
34 [Francis Lieber,] Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
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became in due course the model for the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as for a 
succession of US Army field manuals in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
35 
My third and final example comes from the American social scientists Melvin 
Small and David Singer, who defined civil war in 1972 as: 
 
… sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1000 
battle-field deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an 
insurgent force capable of … inflict[ing] upon the government forces at 
least 5 percent of the fatalities the insurgents sustain.
36 
 
Their definition was the product of much debate and confusion among social scientists 
during the Cold War about the difference between civil war and other kinds of “internal 
warfare” (riot, rebellion, revolution, insurgency) and every element of it was designed to 
secure the boundaries of the definition against imprecision: it had to be a war (rather than 
any other kind of large-scale violence); it had to be internal to an existing state, but not 
exclusively so, in order to include those civil wars that drew in outside forces; it had to 
exclude  one-sided  massacres  and  genocides;  and  it  left  open  the  motivations  of  the 
participants, even as it implied that one side had legitimacy (“central government forces”) 
while the other did not (“an insurgent force”). 
Each of these three overlapping definitions–from the second, the mid-nineteenth 
and the late twentieth centuries–exemplifies one broad era in the transtemporal history of 
                                                 
35  Richard  Shelly  Hartigan,  Lieber's  Code  and  the  Law  of  War  (Chicago:  Precedent 
Publishing, 1983); John Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History 
(New York: Free Press, 2012). 
36 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 
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civil  war:  Appian’s,  a  Roman,  descriptive  and  historical  conception  which  was  the 
product of two centuries of discussion among Roman historians, poets, orators and jurists 
about  Rome’s  own  successive  and  repetitive  conflicts;  Lieber’s,  a  Euro-American, 
normative and legal conception which he had cut from whole cloth and hoped might 
clarify  confusion  on  the  issue;  and  Small  and  Singer’s,  an  American  but  ultimately 
global, empirical and social-scientific definition which sprang from a ferment among 
social scientists in need of a definition to help them analyse big data. All three definitions 
have left their mark on how we currently understand civil war, though each has been 
contentious and much argued-over. 
Civil  war  was  essentially  contested  because,  from  the  very  beginning,  it  was 
internally  contested.  The  Romans  generally  named  their  wars  after  their  adversaries 
(Hannibalic, Jugurthine, Servile …) and this practice made civil war particularly fraught. 
The  term  was  probably  coined—I  use  the  passive  advisedly  because  its  inventor  is 
unknown—on the analogy of the civil law (ius civile), but bellum civile meant more 
precisely a war against cives or citizens. Rome’s wars were, by definition, fought against 
external enemies, or hostes, the literally hostile antitheses to those who were bound into 
the civitas by the common ties of citizenship. And to be a war, a bellum, it had to be just, 
which a contention against one’s fellow-citizens by definition could not be.
37 
The paradoxical, even oxymoronic, nature of bellum civile—a war that could not 
be justified as a war, fought against enemies who could not be called enemies—accounts 
for the overwhelming Roman reticence on the topic of civil war well into the first century 
                                                 
37 Veit Rosenberger, Bella et expeditiones. Die antike Terminologie der Kriege Roms 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992); Brown, “The Terms Bellum Sociale and Bellum 
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CE. Yet, by the time Appian composed his history of Rome’s intestine conflicts, war 
between citizens had occurred so often, and its shape had become so sharply defined, that 
his  description  of  Sulla’s  march  on  the  city  encapsulated  a  consensus  on  its  form. 
Trumpets  and  standards  were  the  visible  signs,  conventional  warfare  the  means,  and 
control of Rome the aim: all told, these were the identifying marks of civil war rather 
than the signs of mere tumult, dissension or sedition. Appian also implied the existence of 
a narrative, within which Sulla’s assault was the original episode.  
The  works  of  Caesar,  Sallust,  Lucan,  Tacitus,  Plutarch,  Appian,  Florus  and 
Augustine,  to  name  only  the  most  prominent,  transmitted  versions  of  that  narrative 
throughout the Latin West until at least the late eighteenth century. There was what might 
be called the republican narrative of seemingly endless and recurrent civil wars arising 
from the very fabric of Roman civilisation itself: to be civilised at all was to be prone to 
civil war, and to suffer one civil war opened the way for further destructive dissensions 
within  the  commonwealth.  Then  there  was  a  parallel  imperial  or  Augustan  narrative, 
which followed much the same pattern but held that the only cure for the pathology of 
civil war would be the restoration of monarchy or the exaltation of an emperor. “In this 
way”, wrote Appian, “the Roman polity survived all kinds of civil disturbances to reach 
unity  and  monarchy”:  “an  evident  demonstration”,  agreed  his  late  sixteenth-century 
English translator, “That peoples rule must give place, and Princes power prevayle.”
38 
And finally there was a Christian narrative, constructed most famously by Augustine, the 
last  great  Roman  historian,  which  presented  Rome’s  pagan  history  as  a  catalogue  of 
“those  evils  which  were  more  infernal  because  internal”  (quanto  interiora,  tanto 
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miseriora), a series of “civil, or rather uncivil, discords” (discordiae civiles vel potius 
inciviles).
39 The popularity of these narratives of civil war as repetitive, cumulative and 
transformative, declined only in the period historians call “the Age of Revolutions”, when 
another narrative—of revolutions as similarly recurrent, sequential and transtemporal—
began  to  dethrone  it.
40 A s  s e l f -conscious  revolutionaries  rebranded  civil  wars  as 
revolutions, it was no coincidence that, for instance, editions of the great Roman poet of 
civil war, Lucan, which had been issued almost annually across the eighteenth century, 
ceased,  not  to  re-emerge  into  prominence  until  a  later  age  of  civil  wars  in  the  late 
twentieth century.
41 
Roman conceptions of civil war began as strictly legal but expanded to become 
literary  and  historical.  The  much  later  legal  re-definition  of  civil  war  attempted  by 
Francis Lieber occurred in a radically altered context in the mid-nineteenth century. In 
1863, the US Supreme Court ruled on four cases, known collectively as the Prize Cases, 
arising from President Lincoln’s order in April 1861 to blockade ports from Chesapeake 
Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande on the grounds that the states of the Confederacy had 
raised  “an  insurrection  against  the  Government  of  the  United  States.”  The  plaintiffs 
argued that the Presidential had applied the laws of war to a situation in which they were 
not operative because no war had been declared. Writing for the majority, Justice Robert 
                                                 
39  Augustine,  The  City  of  God  against  the  Pagans,  ed.  R.  W.  Dyson  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 132 (III. 23). 
40  Reinhart  Koselleck,  et  al.,  “Revolution,  Rebellion,  Aufruhr,  Bürgerkrieg”,  in  Otto 
Brunner, Werner Conze and Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches 
Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972-
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(Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). 
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Grier argued that the US was indeed at war with the Southern Confederacy: “A civil war 
is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents—the number, power, and 
organization of the persons who originate and carry it on.”
42 In the immediate wake of 
that  decision,  the  head  of  the  Union  Army,  General  Henry  Halleck,  commissioned 
Francis Lieber to write the first set of codified rules for land warfare. When Lieber sent 
his initial draft to Halleck in February 1863, the General objected that it lacked one 
crucial component: a definition of the peculiar kind of internal conflict in which his Army 
had been engaged for over a year. As he wrote to Lieber, “to be more useful at the present 
time  [the  Code]  should  embrace  civil  war  as  well  as  war  between  states  or  distinct 
sovereignties.”
43 
Yet according to Lieber’s final definition–“war between two or more portions of a 
country or state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be 
the legitimate government”—the American “Civil War” was not a civil war at all. It may 
have been fought between two parts of the country, but only one side aimed at overall 
mastery or claimed to be the legitimate government over the whole territory. By his own 
reckoning, the Civil War was in fact a rebellion: “an insurrection of large extent, and is 
usually a war between the legitimate government of a country and portions or provinces 
of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their 
own.” Indeed, he admitted as much in the second half of his definition of civil war: 
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“sometimes applied to war of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the 
state are contiguous to those containing the seat of government”–hence, presumably, the 
official  Union  designation  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  of  it  as  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion.
44 
These  definitional  difficulties  notwithstanding,  the  Lieber  Code  became  the 
foundation-stone for all later international humanitarian law, and it was reprinted in its 
entirety, including its definitions of insurrection, rebellion and civil war, for use during 
the Philippine-American War in 1902, and its discussion of civil war appeared repeatedly 
until  1940.  Only  in  1990  did  the  US  Army  attempt  a  new  definition  of  civil  war,  a 
conception reduced ad absurdum when the Army’s 2008 Operations Manual devoted 
barely a single paragraph of its 180 tightly-packed pages to civil wars, noting only that 
they “often include major combat operations” and can lead to “massive casualties”.
45 The 
disjunction between Americans’ historical memory of their own internal conflict and the 
experience of civil wars abroad was complete. 
The gradual global shift away from interstate to intrastate warfare after 1945, 
when  combined  with  the  rise  of  the  positivist  social  sciences  and  the  crises  of 
decolonisation, generated new pressures for a definition of what was, and what was not, 
civil  war.  Beginning  in  the  1960s,  American  social  scientists  became  increasingly 
invested in the interpretation of what was called broadly “internal warfare”, a category 
that encompassed everything from guerrilla warfare and insurgencies to civil wars, coups 
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25; [United States, Department of War,] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1880-91). 
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and revolutions.
46 The expansiveness of the category generated anxiety about a lack of 
theoretical  focus  and  dissatisfaction  that  the  examples  were  too  heterogeneous  to  be 
codified or counted. Data could not be theorized and theories lacked supporting data. 
It was to solve this quandary that Melvin Small and David Singer generated the 
third definition of civil war I quoted earlier. They demanded a quantitative, rather than a 
qualitative definition “to minimize subjective bias” and, more pointedly, to “facilitate the 
construction of a data set”, as a means of escaping what they deemed the conceptual 
morass of competing and inconsistent definitions of civil war.
47 The greatest problem 
with their definition is the number of conflicts it does not encompass. Their cut-off of 
1000 battlefield deaths annually would exclude the Troubles in Northern Ireland, for 
which the death-toll was around 3500 fatalities between 1969 and 2001, with a peak of 
479 in 1972. The condition of being “primarily internal” was specified as being “internal 
to  the  metropole”,  in  order  deliberately  to  exclude  post-colonial  wars  of  national 
liberation like the Algerian War. For all its striving to be neutral and objective, this idea 
of  civil  war  was  in  fact  highly  contingent  and  contestable.
48  To  paraphrase  Winston 
Churchill, it was perhaps the worst definition of civil war one could imagine–except 
every other one that has been proposed over the last two centuries. This would hardly 
matter, were it not for the fact that it remains the reigning metric for a civil war among 
social scientists, and is thus the basis for data supplied to institutions like the World Bank 
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Decade of Conceptual Turmoil”, Civil Wars 4 (2001), pp. 93-116; Nicholas Sambanis, 
“What  is  Civil  War?  Conceptual  and  Empirical  Complexities  of  an  Operational 
Definition”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004), pp. 814-58. - 25 - 
and the US State Department as they decide levels of country risk in apportioning aid or 
as they weigh the possibilities for humanitarian intervention in conflicts deemed to be 
“civil”. 
 
* * * * * 
 
I have chosen these three key examples from my history in ideas to illustrate both 
the synchronic and the diachronic dimensions of this emergent genre. Each instance can 
be  seen  to  engage  in  a  conscious  dialogue  with  the  past  history,  conceptual  and 
experiential, of civil war. Appian, because writing in Greek, was compelled to assimilate 
Rome’s civil wars semantically to the Greek term emphylia, even though his precisely 
tailored description of those conflicts showed the great gap between the word and the 
concept,  between  Greek  and  Roman  conceptions  of  civil  strife.
49  Francis  Lieber  had 
searched the corpus of international law for a legal definition of civil war, but found 
none; likewise, he had to define it against revolution, rebellion and insurrection—civil 
war’s not entirely asymmetric counter-concepts, as one might call them
50—in an effort 
directed at ameliorating a specific conflict, within a tightly defined legal context, but with 
an eye to the humanisation of warfare in the future. Finally, Singer and Small sought to 
transcend contextual determinants to create a transhistorical definition of civil war that 
revealed only the marks of its highly contingent birth. Yet their conception not only 
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lingers but flourishes to this day, in tension with legal conceptions of civil war ultimately 
descended  from  Lieber  and  with  historical  conceptions  whose  roots  are  identifiably 
Roman. 
But examples can be no more than exemplary; symptoms cannot approximate 
systems. Even my procedure of combining close, synchronic contextualisation with much 
broader diachronic sweeps of the longue durée may soon appear to be unfashionable and 
outdated rather than dashingly avant-garde. The manual accumulation and analysis of 
sources, to which intellectual historians have been accustomed for a century (and other 
historians  for  much  longer),  is  not  becoming  obsolete,  but  it  is  ever  increasingly 
incomplete: “distant reading” of large accumulations of sources now supplements close 
reading but cannot replace it.
51 The digital revolution’s effects are only just beginning to 
be felt among intellectual historians but they will surely be transformative, both in terms 
of the sheer scale of materials available for analysis and the range of technologies to hand 
for solving old problems and for suggesting new questions. 
Vast collections of sources which would, until recently, have taken an individual 
scholar a lifetime (or more) to collect are now available to undergraduate students and the 
general public alike in the form of digital collections and databases. Google Books, the 
Internet Archive, the HathiTrust Digital Library, the Open Library and soon the Digital 
Public  Library  of  America—to  name  only  the  largest  of  those  that  are  primarily  in 
English and open-access—offer searchable versions of historical materials formerly only 
accessible to credentialed researchers in brick-and-mortar repositories. Before very long, 
thanks  to  these  initiatives,  the  Europeana  project  and  other  national  digital  libraries, 
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everything printed—in Western languages at least—from 1455 to 1922 will be readable 
and most of it will be searchable. This cornucopia of digital material is not confined to 
living languages from the last five hundred years: roughly one billion words of Latin 
from the period 200 BCE to 1922 CE have already been digitised, “eclips[ing] the corpus 
of Classical Latin by several orders of magnitude” and “arguably span[ning] the greatest 
historical  distance  of  any  major  textual  collection  today.”  This  uncurated  collection 
cannot be used innocently or even yet very easily but its range and scope illustrates the 
dizzying possibilities for research over the longue durée offered by digitisation.
52  
Digital tools for humanities research have existed for more than half a century: 
“In  His  mercy,  around  1955,  God  led  men  to  invent  magnetic  tapes”,  wrote  the 
pioneering computational humanist, Roberto Busa, SJ.
53 But their power and variety have 
exploded more recently under the rubric of the “digital humanities”, with new techniques 
for the quantification of textual data competing with novel means for visualisation and 
spatial  analysis.  The  most  familiar  tools  by  now  are  the  N-gram  Viewer  which 
graphically reveals patterns of word-frequency in the corpus of Google Books, the 4% 
(and rising) of all books published in English, Spanish, Hebrew and other languages since 
1800 and Bookworm, which allows similar analysis of the Open Library and Internet 
Archive collections.
54 So far, these tools can only be indicative rather than conclusive. 
They can suggest questions but cannot provide answers in isolation from other forms of 
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textual  immersion  and  comparison.  The  databases  on  which  they  rely  are  not  yet 
complete and are not all fully readable; they also vary in their coverage and reliability. 
Yet handled with care and supplemented with immersive reading in samples of sources, 
key-word searches can generate robust conclusions and point the way to novel inquiries. 
On this basis, more traditional procedures of intellectual history—such as conceptual 
analysis  and  contextualisation—can  also  proceed  with  ever  greater  confidence  in  the 
soundness of generalisations about both qualitative and quantitative change over time.  
Even  to  more  traditional  analogue  humanists,  the  promise  of  the  digital 
humanities  for  transforming  the  work  of  intellectual  historians  is  immense.  The 
increasing availability of vastly larger corpora of texts and the tools to analyse them 
allows historians to establish the conventions that framed intellectual innovation, and 
hence to show where individual agency took place within collective structures. And with 
ever  greater  flexibility  for  searching  and  recovering  contextual  information,  we  can 
discover more precisely and persuasively moments of rupture as well as stretches of 
continuity. In short, we now have both the methodological tools and the technological 
means  to  overcome  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  traditional  objections  to  the  marriage  of 
intellectual history with the longue durée. We can at last get back to studying big ideas in 
a big way. 
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